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1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

' STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

i ·V·
ROY J. TIPPETTS ,

Case No. 15512

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Roy J. Tippetts, appeals from a conviction

I of Robbery, a Felony of the Second Degree, in the Fourth Judicial

f~istrict,

in and for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable J.

Robert Bullock, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Roy J. Tippetts, was charged with Robbery

i :n violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1953 as amended).

On the

11

; ·th day of October, 1977, the appellant was found guilty of the offense
1

as charged by a jury.

Subsequently, the appellant was sentenced to

\ lncarceration at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of
I ine to fifteen years.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks the reversal of this conviction and a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the morning of trial, counsel for the co-defendant was
taken ill and unable to attend trial.

This development was brought to

the attention of the trial court in the judge's chambers by the

appellant's attorney, Mr. Michael Esplin, before the jury was impanele
(R. 1).

At that time a conversation was held between His Honor, Mr.

Esplin, and the co-defendant to determine whether the co-defendant
should be granted a continuance, or whether he would be willing to
go to trial that day represented by Mr. Esplin (R. 2).

The court

explained to Mr. Lopez that a conflict of interest might exist betweer
himself and the appellant.

However, the court did not advise Mr.

Lopez that he had a right to separate

representation, nor did he

seek to ascertain whether Mr. Lopez understood the details of Mr.
Esplin' s possible conflict of interest and the potential perils of sue
a conflict (R. 2).

Instead, the court merely inquired of Mr. Lopez

whether he desired a continuance in the matter or whether he preferrec
to proceed to trial that day with Mr. Esplin representing him (R. Z).
Mr. Lopez indicated his concern over not languishing in jail any longer
while awaiting

a new trial date (R. 2) and assented to going to trial

that day with appellant's counsel as his own counsel (R. 4).
oing
At no time was the appellant present during the f ore g ·

the app e-·l! ;nl
conversation and at no time did the court personally Warn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 2 -

J

of the potential dangers of representation by counsel with a conflict
0f

interest.

Nor did the court ever procure a voluntary waiver of

appellant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
With Mr. Esplin as counsel for both Mr. Lopez and Mr.

~.Tippetts,

the trial commenced as scheduled.

The testimony showed that

on August 30, 1977, at approximately 12:30 a.m. the Riverbend Lounge

I (located

at the mouth of Provo Canyon) was robbed by two men.

Lori

Elliot, a part-time waitress at the Riverbend, identified the two men
who robbed the lounge as the appellant, Roy Tippetts, and his co-

l
defendant, Henry Lopez (R. 13-14).

Three other witnesses testified

\that they were customers at the Riverbend on the morning that it was

I

Irobbed (R. 27, 33, 38).

All three witnesses identified the appellant

lmd his co-defendant as the perpetrators of the robbery (R. 28, 35, 40,
\l).

Trooper John Moon

testified that he apprehended the

appellant, the co-defendant and two other individuals in an automobile
1ear the top of Provo Canyon shortly after he received a radio
communication that a robbery had been perpetrated at the Riverbend
~~ge in Provo Canyon (R.

43-46).

The trooper testified that two

other individuals in the car with the appellant and co-defendant
identified themselves as the brothers of Mr. Lopez (R. 52).
~oney

Some

was located in the automobile (R. 51), however no weapon was

located in the automobile nor was any found at the scene where the
car was stopped (R. 52).
At the conclusion of the State's case, the defense rested
·:ithout calling any witnesses (R. 59).

Based upon the foregoing the
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jury found both the appellant and the co-defendant guilty of robbery. ·
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT'S DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL AT TRIAL WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
A. AN ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTERESTS IN DUAL
REPRESENTATION RENDERS HIS REPRESENTATION INEFFECTIVE.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee an accused'
I
the right to counsel at trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 72 U.S. 335 I

It is well settled that one lawyer may represent more than I

(1963).

one defendant so long as his representation is effective.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

Powell v.

However, effective assistance of counseil

contemplates that such assistance be "untrammeled and unimpaired
by . . .

I
I

requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent

conflicting interests."
1
(1942).

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70

The danger implicit in dual representation is that an
attorney who undertakes such a task finds himself similtaneously
balancing the interests of each defendant against the other.

The

1. The A. B .A. Code of Professional Responsibility precludes ~ la~er ['
from representing one client if the interests of another may impat~ ~i
his independent judgment. Such representation is countenanced 0551
on.ble
after full disclosure is made to the involved parties of the P
effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
judgment on behalf of each of them.
[D.R. 5-105(c)].
1
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problem is aggravated by the fact that an attorney can rarely predict

..

:ihen a conflict of interest will or will not arise.

1

~any

to

There are too

unknown variables in a criminal trial for an attorney to presume

know whether the interests of one client will conflict with another.

one commentator has elaborated on this imbroglio which stalemates
1
I an attorney who seeks to undertake dual representation:

1ed1

I
I
I

I
,eil

I

The interests and defenses of co-defendants are,
as a general rule, antagonistic; and, given the fact
of joint representation, a strong likelihood arises
that a conflict exists or will ensue. The inherent
difficulty in such a situation is that a single
attorney must simultaneously steer the defenses of
each defendant on proper course thereby wasting much
of his valuable courtroom concentration on the task
of preventing scrapes and collisions between multiclient interests. He can no longer freely decide
what will be most advantageous for the defense of
one client without first weighing against it the disadvantages that might consequently accrue to the
other. He must, in short, temper his strategy to a
middle-of-the-road position. This condition, of
course, imposes an artificial and strained approach
on a singular counsel which prevents him from
developing a full, aggressive defensive strategy.
The shattering impact of skilled technique which
ordinarily could be leveled in full force against
the opposition must be partially, and often substantially,
diffused in a constant concern to calculate the
possible harm each maneuver might work on the codefendant. Counsel must pick, choose, compromise
and forego various attacks because of the threat of
adverse repercussions to the interests of the codefendant. He is thereby prevented from the use of
all the weapons in his legal armory. Note, 23 Ark.
L. Rev. 250, 254.
Because of the unforseeability of conflicts of interest,

1
'

l~he A.B.A. has advised that dual representation be undertaken only
1.

eI

tnthemost extraordinary of situations.
'.o

The A.B.A. "Standards Relating

the Administration of Criminal Justice -

The Defense Function"

i

i'JS(b) (1971), warns that:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 5 -

Sixth Amendment representation is lacking if
unknown to the accused and without his knowledgeable assent, his lawyer is in a duplicitous position
where his full talents as a vigorous lawyer having
the single aim of acquittal of all means fair and
honorable are hobbled 2r fettered or restrained by
commitments to others.
The seminal case in the area of dual representation and
ineffective assistance of counsel is Glasser v. United States, supra.
In Glasser v. United States, supra, the government tried five codefendants for conspiracy to defraud the government.

Two of the

five co-defendants, Kretske and Glasser, were initially represented
by separate counsel.

However, at trial Kretske became dissatisfied

with his appointed counsel.

The trial court then ordered Stewart,

the attorney retained by Glasser, to represent Kretske.

The Court
I

agreed with Glasser that his right to effective assistance of counsel
had been abridged by the dual representation.

The Court stated that

1

Stewart's "struggle to serve two masters" did impair his effectivenes;I

<

Although the Court did point to the attorney's failure to cross-

Ii

examine a key witness and his failure to make certain evidentiary

I1

objections as evidence of his dual loyalties, the Court refused to

It

i

require any precise degree of prejudice be shown.

The Court observec d

To determine the precise degree of prejudice
sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's
appointment . . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of
counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow
courts to indul~e in nice calculations as to the
amount of preju ice arising from its denial. 315
U.S. at 75-76.
(Emphasis Supplied)

1

I
I0
15
Ir

I

r
I

. b . 1 . t s tatei . r]
2. Similarly, the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsi. 1. l Yh le!':I ·
that it is the "duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to t e
a:
system, to represent his client zealously.
"
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Later in the opinion, the Court came its closest to
enunciating a standard when it stated that where it appeared from
~he

record that Stewart's representation of Glasser

m~t

have been more effective had there been no dual representation,

I a new trial was necessary. 315 U.S. at 76.

Thus, the thrust of Glasser v. United

,_

I States, supra, would appear to be that actual prejudice need not be

I

shown when an actual conflict develops which inhibits an attorney's
I
I ability to maneuver.
I

Since Glasser v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court has
only recently., re-examined the issue of ineffective assistance of

I

I counsel
I
I u. s.

due to conflicts of interest.

In Holloway v. Arkansas,

(1978), 23 Cr. L. 3001, three co-defendants were jointly

represented by a court appointed lawyer.

Both before trial and later

I at trial, the co-defendants requested separate counsel based on their
1/

appointed attorney's representations that because of confidential

I information received from the co-defendants, he felt he was confronted with representing conflicting interests. On both occasions,
I
I the trial court refused to appoint separate counsel and the co-

1

1! defendants were ultimately convicted.

I
I of

The Supreme Court had little difficulty condemning the actions
the trial court.

The Court held that the failure to either appoint

I separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the
I .k
ns was too remote to warrant separate counsel, in the face of the

I representations
I

made by counsel weeks before trial and again before

the jury was empanelled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of
assistance of counsel.

In reaching this result, the Court ruled that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an aggrieved defendant had no burden whatsoever to demonstrate
prejudice.
This holding was predicated on the Court's reading of
Glasser v. United States, supra, as precluding "nice calculations as
to the amount of prejudice" resulting from the denial of the fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel.

Although the

above quoted language from Glasser v. United States, supra, presupposei
that an accused was prejudiced to some extent by joint representation,
Mr. Justice Burger, writing for the Holloway court, pointed out that

all the caselaw cited in Glasser v. United States, supra, as supportini

that proposition actually presumes prejudice regardless of whether
3
it was independently shown.
From this fact, Mr. Justice Burger conc:u
that the harmless error rule has no application to right to counsel
cases:
Moreover, this court ha[s] concluded that the
assistance of counsel is among those "constitutional
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error."
23 Cr.L. at 3005.
I

3. The Hollowa+ court pointed out that the Supreme Court's refusal to:
reverse Kretske s conviction in Glasser v. United States, supra, wa'.
not contary to its interpretation of that case. Kretske did not raise
any objection on appeal to his joint repesentation.
315 U.~. 60,_71
Rather, some of the other co-defendants argued that Glasser s denial
of effective assitance of counsel prejudiced them as alleged co- .
conspirators. In that context, the Glasser court required a showing
of prejudice.

- 8 -
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rnreaching this conclusion, Mr. Justice Burger explained that even
1

if the Glasser opinion did not mandate automatic reversal, such a

result was logically mandated if such grievances were to be redressed.
This follows because the difficulty with applying the harmless
1

error rule to conflict of interest cases is that discerning prejudice

1

is not susceptible to intelligent and even-handed application.
Elucidating this point, Mr. Justice Burger stated:

1

In the normal case where a harmless error rule is
applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope
is readily identifiable . . . But in a case of joint
representation of conflicting interests the evil it bears repeating - is in what the advocate finds
himself compelled to refrain from doing . . . Thus,
an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would
require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.
23 Cr. L. at 3005.

I

I

I Thus, the
1

Holloway court concluded that because of the masked nature

of such an error, requiring a defendant to show any amount of prejudice

would be too much.
The appellant concedes that the per se reversal rule
I announced in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, is
· on 1y triggere
·
d went
h
he

I attorney

brings the potential or actual conflict of interest to the

attention of the trial court.

However, the appellant contends that

although Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, does not require automatic
reversal in the instant case, Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, does hold
that even in the instant case, appellant need not show any quantum of
prejudice.

This is so because the rule announced in Holloway v.

~ansas, supra, which presumes prejudice, regardless of whether it

is shown independently, is not affected by whether the attorney does
~ does not alert the trial court to the possibility or actuality of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the conflict of interest.

Regardless of whether the attorney who

has undertaken the responsibility of dual representation warns the
trial court about conflict problems, the same "unguided speculation",
I

which persuaded the Holloway court to simply presume prejudice _ ex:I
Certainly if the problem

of "unguided speculation" precludes a re-

viewing court from applying the harmless error rule to the situation I
where the attorney has warned the trial court, then that same problec
1

logically inheres in the situation where the attorney fails to warn
the trial court.
In this regard, it is helpful to review what
Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, did not decide. Significantly,
the Holloway court specifically reserved ruling on how an attorney's

I

failure to advise the trial court of the potentiality or actuality of
of a conflict impacts on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In that situation, the Holloway court observed that two issues are
cormnonly raised:

1) how strong a showing of conflict must be made

and 2) what duty does the trial court have to alert defendants to
the dangers implicity lurking in dual representation.
I

It seems clear that these are the issues that the Hollow~

1

I

court viewed as uniquely affecting the situation in the instant case
where the attorney neglects to advise the trial court of the conflic'.
problem.

However

nothing in the language or the reasoning of the

Holloway opinion would indicate that when the attorney fails to brini
the conflict to the attention of the trial court that the aggrieved
defendant then must shoulder the burden of showing how that conflict
prejudiced his representation.

On the contrary, the thrust of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1

~loway decision makes clear that "a rule requiring a defendant to

show a conflict of interests . .

prejudiced him in some specific

fashion would not be susceptible to intelligent, even-handed application."
Thus, in the instant case this Court need not consider how
the appellant was prejudiced by dual representation.

Instead, we must

hasten into the thicket avoided by the Holloway court and consider
first, what duty does the trial court have to alert defendants to
the dangers of dual representation, and second, how strong a showing
of conflict must be made.

In addition to these issues specifically

noted by the Holloway court, two other issues are inextricably interrnined in a dual representation case:

who bears the burden of persuasion

and what is the impact of an absence of waiver.
B. THE TRIAL COURT HAS AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO
ASCERTAIN THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT DEPRIVED OF THEIR
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY JOINT
REPRESENTATION OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS.
Although it is true that the right to effective assistance
of counsel may be waived, a valid waiver requires an "intelligent
relinguishment or abandonment of a known right."
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
~ited States, 397 U.S.

·valid

Johnson v. Zerbst,

This standard was refined in Brady v.

742, 748 (1970), where the Court required that

waivers not only be voluntary, but also be "knowing, intelligent

acts done with sufficinet awareness of the relevant circumstances and
likely consequences."
right is involved.

This standard applies whenever a fundamental

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).

The protection

afforded fundamental rights was made clear in Glasser v. United States,
'l~pr~, where the Court stated that "we indulge every reasonable preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sumption against the waiver of fundamental rights."
In Glasser v. United States, supra, we also find the root
of the trend towards placing an affirmative duty on the trial court
to ascertain that the fact of joint representation is not merely a
fortuitous occurrence, but rather, that it reflects a knowing and
intelligent decision to forego the constitutional right to conflict·
free, separate counsel.

The Glasser court states:

The trial court should protect the right of an
accused to have the assistance of counsel. "This
protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining
whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver
by the accused. While an accused may waive the
right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver
should be clearly determined by the trial court,
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that
determination to appear upon the recor~."
(Citations omitted). 315 U.S. at 71.

In Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir., 1%
the court recognized that a fundamental right -

the right to effect

assistance of counsel -

was unwittingly and routinely being waived

by criminal defendants.

In an attempt to prevent this sort of un·

knowing forfeiture of Sixth Amendment

rights.the court announced

a rule requiring a trial judge to insure that co-defendants' decisio:
to proceed with one attorney was an informed decision.

The court

explained the need for such an inquiry as follows:
The judge's responsibility is not necessarily
discharged by simply accepting the co-defendants'
designation of a single attorney to represent them
both. An individual defendant is rarely
sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential
conflicts, and when two defendants appear with a

4. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-724 (194 8) ! where
lvemettl
Supreme Court reaffirmed the need for affirmative judicial invo
in the waiver process.
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single attorney it cannot be determined, absent
inquiry by the trial judge, whether the attorney
has made such an appraisal or has advised his
clients o~ the risks. Considerations of
efficient judicial administration as well as
important rights of defendants are served when
the trial judge makes the affirmative determination
that co-defendants have intelligently chosen to
be represented by the same attorney and that their
decision was not governed by poverty and lack of
information on the availablility of counsel.
352 F.2d at 360.
Numerous other courts have similarly recognized the propriety of
5
allocating this duty to the trial court.
C. THE ABSENCE OF A WAIVER SHIFTS THE BURDEN OF
PROOF TO THE STATE ON THE QUESTION OF EITHER THE
EXISTENCE OF A CONFLICT OR THE PREJUDICE RESULTING
FROM A CONFLICT.
The appellant submits that in the instant case where no onthe-record waiver of his right to conflict-free, separate counsel
appears (R. 1-4), the burden shifts to the State to prove either that
no conflict existed, or that the conflict did not impair his representation at trial.

The importance of the right to counsel has sparked

icourts to formulate just such a prophylactic rule to insure its
I

protection.
In United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir., 1974),
a drug defendant challenged his conviction where his attorney had also
represented his co-defendant.

In rejecting this claim, the Court found

that there was no divergence in the interests of the co-defendants. Although the
l. See, United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, (1st Cir., 1974);
~n v. United States, 396 F.Zd 110, 114 (2d Cir., 1968~; United
~sex rel. Hart v. Daven~ort, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir., 1973);
~d States v. Tru~lio, 49 F.2d 574 (4th Cir., 1974); and United
~ v. Garcia 51 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir., 1975), which sets
·;~t a Boykin-lik~ procedure for the waiver of the right to conflict, ee separate counsel.
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First Circuit held that dual representation had not adversely
affected the defendant in that case, the Court went

on to announci

a rule that the lack of a satisfactory judicial inquiry into dual
representation shifts the burden of proof on the question of prejui
to the government.

In such a situation, the government is requirea

to demonstrate from the record the unlikelihood of prejudice by a
preponderance of the evidence.

In stating this rule, the Court

specifically recognized the difficulties associated with an after-t
fact reconstruction of prejudice.
The Minnesota Supreme

Court has recently announced a

simila+:" burden-shifting device to protect Sixth Amendment rights.
State v. Olsen, 258 N.W. 2d 898 (Minn., 1977), the rule is stated
this way:

whenever a satisfactory inquiry does not appear on the

record, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that a prejudicial conflict of interest did not exi
In justifying this rule, the Minnesota court explained that it has
the benefit of protecting Sixth Amendment rights in such a way that
it promotes effective judicial administration by providing an

independent basis for appellate courts to easily assess the voluntar
iness of the waiver of this right.

To insure that defendants volun·

tarily and knowingly opt for dual representation, the Minnesota co~
requires a comprehensive, Boykin-like inquiry by the trial court:
The court should address each defendant personally
and advise him of the potential danger of dual
representation. The defendant should have an
opportunity and be at liberty to question the
trial court on the nature and consequences of
dual representation and the entire procedure
should be placed on the record for review.
258 N.W. 2d at 907.
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Significantly, the dissenting opinion in Holloway v.
rkansas, supra, also endorses the burden-shifting rules announced

1
e
--

.n United States v.

Foster, supra, and State v. Olsen, supra, as

n alternative to the per se rule announced by the majority opinion.

1

n his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Powell writes:
I would follow the lead of the several Courts of
Appeals that have recognized the trial court's
duty of inquiry in joint representation cases
without minimizing the constitutional predicate
of "conflicting interests".
n footnote 3, Mr. Justice Powell cites United States v. Carrigan,

43 F.2d 1053 (2nd Cir., 1976), as illustrative of one of the "duty
f inquiry" cases which he would endorse in lieu of the per se rule

dopted by the majority opinion.

In that case, two defendants were

ointly represented by a single attorney.

The record reflected

hat the trial court made no inquiry into the possibility of a conflict
f interest.

On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions

fboth defendants.

The Court held the trial court has an affirmative

uty to inquire into the possiblity of a conflict of interest.

When

o such inquiry is made, the burden of proof on the question of prejudice

1ifts to the government.
The Eighth Circuit declined to adopt any burden-shifting

F. 2d

rocedure in United States v. Lawriw,

, (8th Cir.,

l77), 22 Cr. L. 2369, although it does require the trial court to

induct a Boykin-like inquiry into the decision of co-defendants to

:cept dual representation.

1

Without shifting the burden of persuasion

the issue of prejudice, the Lawriw court effectively accomplishes

ie same result.

This

is

done

by

focusing

ire attention on the validity of the waiver of a constitutional
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right.

As the Court explains:
While the potential for prejudice is not so inherent
as to require a per se rule of conflict, it is nonetheless sufficiently persuasive that only a minimal
showing of conflict should be required to invoke
constitutional protection. Thus, in most cases the
question will not be so much whether a conflict
existed, but whether the defendant effectively
waived it. 22 Cr. L. 2370.

Accordingly, the Lawriw court warns:
. . . that without such an inquiry a finding of
knowing and intelligent waiver will seldom, if
ever, be sustained by this Court . . . Considering
the minimal showing needed to establish the substantial possiblity of a conflict of interest, the
importance of an adequate record to underpin a
finding of waiver cannot be overstated. The
administration of justice is best served by such
an inquiry and we now require it.
Thus, although it is the appellant's position that the

issue of prejudice was foreclosed by Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, i
it is an issue, then the State bears the burden of proof on that is>
since the record clearly shows that the trial court made no inquiry
whatsoever into the possibility of a conflict of interest.
D. THE APPELLANT NEED ONLY SHOW THAT A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST EXISTED.
Assuming arguendo that the absence of a waiver is not

dispositive of the issue in the instant case, appellant submits that
he need only show that the conflict of interest did exist.

Appellan'

submits that the unique feature of conflict of interest cases is that

it is extremely difficult to point to tangible evidence of the consen·
flict. This is so because the attorney who undertakes dual repre
tation may strive to reconcile the conflict.

. . n

The majority op1n 10
l

11re:

in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, recognized this peculiar pro b em·
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it stated:

But in a case of joint representation of conflicting
interests the evil - it bears repeating - is in
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing
. . (Emphasis in original) 23 Cr. L.
at 3005.
In Austin v. Erickson, 477 F.2d 620 (8th Cir., 1973), the
Court warned that the appearance of having consciously chosen one
defense over another may be mis leading, and often belies the efforts
of an attorney "to reconcile conflicting interests rather than to
enforce, to their full extent, the rights of the party whom he
should alone represent.

. ."

477 F. 2d at 625.

The Court in Austin further noted:
It must be remembered that in cases involving
conflicts of interest, the conflict does not always
appear full-blown upon the record since counsel may
throughout endeavor to reconcile the conflict. 477
F. 2d at 626.
Accordingly, the Austin court, in granting a writ of habeas corpus,
concluded

that once an actual conflict of interest had been established

the petitioner had met her burden.
In People v. Gallardo, 74 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1969), the
California Court applied the harmless error rule in reversing the
convictions of two co-defendants represented by the same attorney.
In that case, the Court only required a potential conflict of interest
to trigger a reversal.

The facts in Gallardo bear

to the facts in the case at bar.

a marked resemblance

In that case, both defendants informed

'.he trial court on the day of trial that they felt a conflict of interest
nrecluded their court appointed attorney from effectively representing
!Oth

of their interests at trial.

The court appointed attorney
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informed the court that he did not feel there was any conflict.
The trial court denied the defendants' requests for separate

co~s

At the trial which innnediately followed, the defendants presented
no evidence.
Noting that the record may be silent as to the existence
of a conflict, the Gallardo court held that a potential conflict
suffices:
Separate counsel for each defendant, throughout
the proceedings might have employed tactics for
the best interest of his defendant, including a
vigorous assault on the remaining defendant, without having to consider the interest of such other
defendant. Where, on the other hand, counsel
represents both defendants, he must . . . "make
connnon cause" for both clients. If he does not
he runs the risk of throwing one client to the
wolves, to benefit the other . . . If he chooses
the former course, the record is not likely to
contain any positive evidence of an actual
conflict. 74 Cal. Rptr. at 575-576.
In the instant case, while there is no question as to the
good faith of appellant's court appointed attorney, the fact of the
matter is that just as in People v. Gallardo, supra, he was mistakeni
his belief that there was no conflict.
The affidavits of the appellant and Sandra Gibson attache
hereto as Appendix A and B, leave no doubt that the appellant and
the co-defendant had antagonistic defenses.

In the case at bar,

just as in People v. Gallardo, supra, no evidence was presente d· I
we view this decision not to put on a defense as the "tip of the
iceberg", it is readily apparent that counsel for appellant adopted

this middle-of-the-road strategy to appease the conflicting interest
of his two clients.
The Third Circuit also only requires a showing of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 18 -

possible conflict of interest to sustain an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim.

The Third Circuit explained its view of the legal

standard to be applied in conflict of interest cases in Hart v.
~enport,

478 F.2d 203, 210 (3d Cir., 1973):
On the other hand, we have rejected the approach
that before relief will be considered the defendant
must show some specific instance of prejudice
[Citations omitted] Instead, we have held that upon
a showing of a possible conflict of interest or
prejudice, however remote, we will re~ard joint
re resentation as c nstitutionall de ective.
Emphasis Supp ied
In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70 (4th Cir., 1966), Sawyer

denied his guilt while his co-defendant admitted in a confession
his own complicity, accused Sawyer of participation in the robbery,
and endeavored to pass most of the blame onto Sawyer.

In granting

Sawyer's writ of habeas corpus, the Fourth Circuit agreed with
him that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where
his court appointed attorney also represented his co-defendant.
A closer examination of the facts in Sawyer reveals a
startling similarity to the facts in the case at bar.

In Sawyer,

the trial court viewed the confession as only implicating the codefendant, and accordinly, ruled that it was admissible against him
alone.

At Sawyer's habeas corpus hearing, his court appointed lawyer

testified that he did not feel any conflict of interest existed
Detween the co-defendants since he never viewed the co-defendant's
statement as inculpating the defendant.

Thus, the clear implication

\. Also holding that a possible conflict of interest is sufficient
' 0 sustain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Walker
~ted States, 422 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.
1973).
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of the attorney's testimony was that his representation of Sawyer
was not hampered by any attempt to accomodate both co-defendants.
Notwithstanding the attorney's representations, the Fourt'
Circuit stated that "despite these appearances, we cannot be persuaded that the jealously guarded constitutional right to

effect~

assistance of counsel has been accorded to Sawyer." 358 F. 2d at 73.
In reaching this result, the Court in Sawyer construed the

~

formulation as follows:
The salient fact remains that divergent interests
did exist, and therefore an opportunity was presented
for the impairment of Sawyer's right to the unfettered
assistance of counsel. It is not necessary that Sawyer
delineate the precise manner in which he has been
harmed by the conflict of interest; the possibility
of harm is sufficinet to render his conviction invalid.
358 F.2d at 73.
In Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir., 1975),
it was held that merely foreclosing a plausible defense required a
reversal.

In that case four teenage inmates had been charged with

the murder of a fellow inmate.

The petitioner and two of the other

co-defendants were represented by the same court appointed attorney.
The fourth co-defendant was represented by a retained attorney. The
Court held that a conflict of interest did exist where because of
petitioner's joint representation, he was unable to accuse one of
the boys as being the sole perpetrator.

The Court explained that

it was not necessary to show that the defense would have been
successful:
Rather, if the record shows that a plausible defense
(one that might have influenced twelve reasonabl7 . d
jurors) was foreclosed because it might have preJ1:1dic~
the other defendants represented by the same appointe
counsel, the conviction must be overturned. 516 F.
2d at 1079.
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_J

In the instant case, appellant's joint representation
precluded him from accusing the co-defendant and his brother of
being the two that robbed the Riverbend Lounge (See Appendix A and
B).

However, had the appellant been represented by an attorney whose

loyalties were unimparied by a conflict of interest, he could have
cross-examined the co-defendant and both his brothers to show that
he never entered the Riverbend Lounge on the evening it was robbed.
fuis version of the facts is not without support in the record.
Trooper Moon testified that the appellant had only two dollars in
his pocket when arrested (R. 53) whereas one of the Lopez brothers
had fifty or sixty dollars in his pocket (R. 53).
CONCLUSION
The appellant was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because his attorney's conflict of interest precluded him
from zealously asserting a plausible defense in his behalf, to-wit:
the co-defendant and his brother robbed the Riverbend Lounge;
appellant did not.

the

Mr. Esplin could not point to Lopez' guilt to

shield the appellant because he also represented Lopez.

The conflict

was thus real.
Because the trial court never advised the appellant of
the dangers of dual representation, and because no waiver of the right
to conflict-free, separate counsel appears on the record, the burden
shifts to the State to prove either that no conflict of interest
existed, or that the conflict did not prejudice the appellant.
Even if this Court should reject the burden-shifting procedure
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adopted by the Foster, Olsen, and Carrigan courts, appellant's

I

I

conviction should still be reversed since he has demonstrated that
an actual conflict of interest did exist.
supra, prohibits this Cotrrt

from

Glasser v. United State 1

1

'

indulging in "nice calculations" as r·

the amount of prejudice resulting from the denial of conflict-free,"'II
separate counsel.

315 U.S. at 75-76.
i

I

Although the per se rule announced in Holloway v. Arkansa1,'

supra, was couched in terms of the situation where the attorney bro9\
the potential conflict of interest to the attention of the trial cou.-:;

appellant contends that limiting the holding to that particular set I
of facts is unwarranted.

Certainly it would be unfair to penalize

the appellant because his court appointed lawyer failed to warn
the trial court that a conflict of interest existed between the co·
defendants.

I

I
I

The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the fact

that few defendants can, realistically, protect their own rights
or appraise the quality of their representation.

304 U.S. 458, 462-463 (1938).

~J~o~h=n~s~o~n~v.:....:....._Z_e_r_bstj

Scant justification exists for imput9

responsibility for the attorney's conduct to the defendant.
Moreover, it must be remembered that any conflict of
interest case is really a problem of ineffective assistance of

counse:~

The very fact that appellant's counsel failed to appreciate that a
conflict of interest existed and thereby neglected to warn the trial

i

court is the heart of appellant's assignment of error.

!

Under the

circumstances, appellant's counsel had no business even acquiescini
i · 's I
to the court's request to represent the co-defendant. Mr. Esp in l
loyalties should have been uncompromisingly committed to the appellt:!
It would be ironic indeed, if Mr. Esplin ' s f ai 1 ure to recognize the
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conflict of interest -

the very error appellant now complains of -

renders his claim somehow unripe, or waived.

The fact that neither

the trial court not appellant's lawyer appreciated the possiblity
that appellant's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel was being infringed by dual representation should not
prejudice appellant's claim.

Persuasive on this point is Holland v.

Boles, 225 F. Supp. 863 (N.D.W. Va., 1963), wherein the Court made
these apt observations:
There remains for consideration the effect, if
any, of the fact that the record here is devoid of
proof that either the regular judge or the special
judge was sufficiently aware of the factual situation
to recognize and appreciate the inevitable conflict
of interests. The effect upon the accused is the
same whether or not the court knew Holland was
impro¥erly represented. He has not been accorded
the e fective representation by counsel to which he
is constitutionally entitled. . . Judge Denman, of
the Ninth Circuit, in the original opinion in
Ha~an v. United States, 187 F.2d 456, at page 460
( 1 1) , has this to say: "If, unknown to the court,
the accused's counsel were bribed by an enemy of
the accused to throw his case and the accused learned
of it after conviction, the fact that the court had
nothing to do with the wrong done, does not deprive
him of his right to the writ." (Emphasis Supplied)
For these reasons, appellant respectfully submits that
the Court below should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new
trial.
Respectfully Submitted,
~--.

·,.\_.· ',;._.\..,'·r·
_...,1

;S l J \./,.v(
---'

WALTER F. BUGDEN, JR.
Attorney for Appellant
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APPENDIX A

I1
I

I

I
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APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

I ROY J . TIPPETTS ,

Case No. 15512

Defendant-Appellant.

I

I, ROY J. TIPPETTS, being first duly sworn according to law
depose and say:
1.

That I am the defendant-appellant in the above entitled

2.

That I believe that a conflict of interest with my co-

I action.
!

I

defendant prevented me from receiving effective assitance of counsel.
3.

That I know that my attorney, Mr. Michael Esplin, was

fully cognizant of this conflict.

4.
1

I

1

conversation

That I know he was aware of this conflict because of a
I had with him sometime in September, at his office.

Both Joy Anderson, my sister, who lives in Seattle, Washington, and
Sandra Gibson, 648 East Ramona Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, were

' present at this conversation.

On that occasion, I specifically told

: Mr· Esplin that al though I was in the car when we were
i
j

apprehended by

the state Trooper, I was not one of the two who robbed the
Riverbend Lounge.

I told Mr. Esplin that my co-defendant and one

of his brothers -

whom I specifically named -

were the ones who
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5.

That I asked the co-defendant's brothers to testify

in my behalf, but that they both flatly refused.
6.

That I told Mr. Esplin that the Lopez brothers refus;

to voluntarily appear and testify for me.
7.

That Mr. Esplin indicated he would subpoena the Lope;

brothers for trial, but he never did.

_2 )~day

DATED this

::J /- ~

of

1978.

Defendant-Appellant
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of

)

SS.

On the 2 ) /.1 day of

..2

)

-

->,

'

1978, personally appeare

before me ROY J. TIPPETTS, the signer of the foregoing instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

My Commission Expires:
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APPENDIX B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT

. STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

Case No. 15512

I ROY J. TIPPETTS,

Defendant-Appellant.
I, SANDRA GIBSON, being first duly sworn according to law
depose and say:
1.

I was

That I was present when the appellant, ROY J. TIPPETTS,

interviewed sometime in early September by his attorney, Mr.

Michael Esplin, at the Utah County Legal Defender Association Office,
107 East 100 South, #29, Provo, Utah

84601.

Also present at that

interview was Joy Anderson, now residing in Seattle, Washington.
2.

That at that interview, the appellant told his attorney

that he did not rob the Riverbend Lounge; he did specify by name the
two men who did.
DATED this _;(_, !] day of

f1,q f

' 1978.

/

SARAGIBSON
f7

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this )l -

day of

' 1978.
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